



Balancing Act: Bolivia's Drug Control Advances and Challenges

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Bolivian President Evo Morales's "coca yes, cocaine no" policy, which seeks to make a clear distinction between coca and cocaine, is now in its third year. A fundamental pillar of the policy is cooperative coca reduction in the Chapare coca growing region and the extension of this approach into areas previously unaffected by forced coca eradication.

While the Morales administration's strategy has been met with skepticism by U.S. and some UN officials, the cooperative reduction approach may prove to be more successful in the long term in containing coca production than the previous forced-eradication strategy. Indeed, in 2006, Bolivia fared better than both Peru and Colombia in stemming increased net coca production.¹ And since the Morales administration took office, interdiction efforts have increased significantly. The Morales administration has continued to coordinate and collaborate with U.S., UN and European Union (EU) anti-drug programs and has addressed international concerns by honing existing programs and launching new initiatives. However, this has at times has generated friction with coca farmers. Presently, the Bolivian government faces serious challenges in carrying out its coca reduction strategy in the La Paz Yungas and in other areas of new coca planting.

U.S.-Bolivian Relations: Mixed Messages

In fact, in spite of continued bilateral friction, mixed messages sent by both governments, and what the U.S. refers to as "challenges in transitioning to a new policy environment,"² U.S.-Bolivian counter-drug collaboration remains strong. In September 2006, the Bush administration considered that Bolivia's "policy of 'zero cocaine, but not zero coca' has focused primarily on interdiction, to the exclusion of its other essential complements, especially coca crop eradication."³ More recently, the State Department provided a less critical assessment: "Bilateral cooperation in IAD (Integrated Alternative Development) remains strong. In the early part of 2007, the U.S. Mission, in consultation with counterparts from the Government of Bolivia, adjusted its IAD program to more strategically support the GOB's net coca rationalization strategy and diversified development with declining budget resources."⁴ One U.S. State department official characterized drug policy as "the best area of bilateral cooperation" in U.S.-Bolivian relations.⁵

The Bolivian government has sought continued bilateral collaboration, but with greater respect for the country's sovereignty. According to Felipe Cáceres, Vice-Minister of Social Defense, "We want to collaborate with the United States, but on our own terms. In the past, the Bolivian government had to ask permission from the U.S. Embassy for each helicopter flight used during anti-drug missions. We make those decisions now; we come up with the flight plans for U.S. funding, and we respect our agreements, but we are in control." Similarly, Defense Minister Walker

San Miguel stated, “I’d say that there was more agreement than differences.”⁶ Bolivian and U.S. officials meet regularly to coordinate policy, implement programs and operations, and resolve issues.

The Bolivian government points to a variety of advances and achievements in its coca and counter-drug policy in 2007, including:

- Under the Morales administration, interdiction of illicit drugs increased significantly in 2006 and 2007, in collaboration with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).⁷
- In April 2007, the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), reported that coca cultivation in 2006 was “statistically unchanged as compared to the 2005 estimate” and that “(c)ocaine potential production remained unchanged ... from 2005 to 2006.” (Estimates for 2007 are not yet available.)
- The Bolivian government eliminated 6,269 hectares of coca in 2007, surpassing its self-established goal of 5,000 hectares, which the U.S. qualified as an “accomplishment.”⁸ By mid-April 2008, approximately 1,300 hectares of coca had been eliminated.
- The registry of coca growers permitted to cultivate the *cato*⁹ of coca in the Chapare was completed. Bolivian officials have stated that no additional families will be allowed to plant coca in the region.
- GPS technology is being used to map the location of permitted *catos* in order to impede replanting and the expansion of coca cultivation in the Chapare.
- A study to measure the market demand for legal coca use, pending since 2004, is about to get underway (see below, page 7).
- In response to concerns cited by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Morales administration extended coca crop reduction efforts to the Isiboro Secure National Park and intensified coca reduction in other protected areas and cultivation expansion zones, such as Yapacani.¹⁰ The government signed an agreement with coca producer representatives in La Asunta (La Paz Yungas) for the reduction of 1,000 hectares of coca. Although only 230 hectares were eliminated in 2007, this was the largest amount ever in that region.
- Bolivia signed a bilateral agreement with Brazil in November 2007 to strengthen anti-drug cooperation on the border.

Speculative U.S. Report on Terrorism Complicates Bilateral Relations

The State Department’s April 2008 “Country Reports on Terrorism” cited “increasing coca cultivation” as one of four reasons that “Bolivia showed new potential as a possible site for terrorist activity.” The report added that “supporters and actors from the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia [sic] (FARC), the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)” and others “were thought to be present in Bolivia.”¹¹ No evidence was provided to support these assertions. In spite of this speculation, unlike Peru and Colombia – and in part due to the farmers’ successful efforts to articulate their political demands within the political system – coca production has occurred in different regions of Bolivia without the presence of guerilla or paramilitary groups.

As the Morales administration continues to collaborate to meet anti-drug objectives, the resurrection by the U.S. of the “narco-terrorist” theory – in the absence of any evidence of an

existing threat – is a strategic error which could further impede U.S. Bolivian relations. Moreover, such conjectures could stoke Bolivia’s domestic political dispute, as President Morales’s opponents are seeking to discredit the administration and present the country as increasingly ungovernable.

This is not the first time that the U.S. government has attempted to link Morales’s MAS party and coca growers to “terrorist” groups. In 2003, General James T. Hill, then-Commander of U.S. Southern Command, warned in reference to MAS that, “in Bolivia, narco-terrorists and a radical political party have combined efforts to undermine the elected government.”¹² Hill later added that, “If radicals continue to hijack the indigenous movement, we could find ourselves faced with a narco-state that supports the uncontrolled cultivation of coca.”¹³ Despite denials by Bolivian government officials of any such links with insurgent groups, the Bush Administration requested double the amount of foreign military funding for fiscal year 2004 citing in part, the need for “equipment and training for the Bolivian army’s new counterterrorism unit.”¹⁴

In April 2003 the Bolivian police detained a Colombian citizen, Francisco Cortés and two coca grower leaders for alleged participation in a “narco-guerilla organization.” During the following two years, the “narco-terrorist” hypothesis prompted a series of arbitrary arrests of 35 coca grower leaders, supposedly linked to the Cortés case, based on fabricated or questionable evidence.¹⁵ Although courts dropped charges in 2005 for lack of evidence against 22 of the accused, which included current MAS government officials, cases are still pending against 15 coca growers and Cortés, and could be reactivated at any time. New, ungrounded accusations of a potential terrorist threat, supposedly linked to increased coca cultivation, could again be used to justify arbitrary arrests and prosecutions.¹⁶ In addition to the human rights implications, such action would create tensions and potential conflicts in the areas where the government’s coca reduction strategies are being carried out.

Negotiated Coca Reduction Faces Obstacles in Some Regions

The success of the Morales administration’s cooperative coca reduction strategy hinges on the voluntary participation of all coca growing regions in the nation and on balancing pressures from the international community with the demands of its coca growing constituents. To date, almost all coca reduction has occurred in the Chapare, the President’s home region. The relative success of the policy to date in the Chapare stems, in part, from the coca growers federations’ ability to implement cooperative coca reduction; agreement within the affected communities that it is in everyone’s interests to limit coca production (and hence to prevent its price from dropping); and the implementation of economic development programs that offer complementary sources of income. Moreover, sanctions for failure to comply with the one *cato* limit are severe, including the loss of the right to grow coca and land expropriation.¹⁷ In April 2008, Bolivian anti-drug officials warned that these sanctions would also apply to land used for drug production.¹⁸ Chapare farmers expect coca growers in the La Paz Yungas to also adhere to government policy, and perceive La Paz Yungas coca producers as having benefited from increased coca production there during the years of forced eradication in the Chapare (1996-2004).¹⁹

Both Bolivian and U.S. officials generally agree that formidable obstacles remain as the government seeks to implement its policy in areas of the country where there is greater resistance to negotiated crop reduction, specifically the La Paz Yungas. One U.S. drug control official observed that the “situation in Yungas is complicated, but the Bolivian government is making an effort to reduce coca there.”²⁰ Although the Morales administration has initiated coca reduction in the

region, widespread compliance with cooperative eradication has been slow and the amount of coca eliminated to date remains low.²¹

One union leader from La Asunta in the Yungas explained that his community agrees with cooperative coca reduction in principle, but is still uncertain about the way it will be carried out: “I really think it would be better. What happens if after a few years the demand for coca falls; then how will we survive? We’ve seen in the Chapare that ‘rationalization’ has allowed them to diversify their crops, we see that it can do that for us, but we still haven’t been able to reach a consensus here... There are communities that have started cooperative eradication, but they are going down that road without clarity... There aren’t goals defined about how far it should go – that’s why rationalization hasn’t been implemented in this part of La Asunta.”²²

Yungas Coca Growers Protest Plans to Initiate Forced Eradication

On April 10, 2008, Felipe Cáceres, Vice-Minister of Social Defense, announced that the government would initiate forced eradication using the Joint Task Force (a combined military and police unit) in seven regions of new coca planting.²³ This is partially out of frustration that negotiations have failed to result in voluntary eradication agreements in regions like Yapacani, which received development assistance in the past in exchange for eliminating their coca.²⁴ It also reflects government and international concerns that coca production in parts of the Yungas has increased significantly and that it continues to expand into new areas of the country. “In new production areas,” stated Cáceres, “if we don’t reach agreements ... we will have to go in with force.” He added that farmers’ poverty does not justify increased coca expansion and that the government’s failure to act would erode its international legitimacy, and hence would potentially jeopardize the entire coca reduction strategy.²⁵

Yet the potential costs within Bolivia of initiating forced eradication are quite high. Its implementation in certain areas of the country could erode the credibility of the Morales administration, which has highlighted the importance of negotiated coca reduction so as to avoid violence and respect human rights. The Bolivian anti-drug strategy affirms, “Bolivia proposes reaching a realistic goal – difficult to achieve through forced eradication – in a sustainable way based on social control of [coca] cultivation and its extension, without human rights violations.”²⁶ Yet the Bolivian government is now proposing to have the military renew forced manual coca reduction, despite their past record of conflict with local communities and persistent human rights violations carried out during coca eradication campaigns.²⁷ Given the tensions that have existed in the past between the Joint Task Force and coca growing communities, the potential for conflict and violence runs high. Resistance will most likely be even stronger in other areas of coca expansion, especially those in the Santa Cruz Department, where regional tensions continue.

Coca growers from La Asunta in the La Paz Yungas immediately protested announced forced eradication and demanded Cáceres’s resignation, although only peripheral areas bordering that region could potentially be targeted for forced eradication. MAS congressional representative, Lino Villca, warned, “I think they have to be careful because, we, the Yungas coca growers, are not going to let the Joint Task Force in here... Not even the most repressive governments dared to carry out rationalization or forced eradication here.”²⁸ The lag in successful development initiatives to complement coca production in new cultivation regions has contributed to the friction between the communities and the government.

It is in the interests of both sides to reach a negotiated accord. The government risks undermining its coca reduction strategy by resorting to the approach it so heavily criticized prior to and upon taking office. The communities resisting limiting coca production, on the other hand, are not likely to have a government more sensitive to their plight. Moreover, in resisting reasonable coca reduction, they risk the arrival of the strife and conflict that characterized the Chapare for so many years. Key to the success of any strategy in these coca growing regions will be significant and sustained economic development efforts. Only when secure complementary livelihoods are in place will coca reduction efforts be able to bear fruit.

USAID: Old Mistakes in a New Context

USAID could have an important role to play in promoting alternative livelihoods in coca growing regions. Unfortunately, gains made between 2003 and 2006 in improving the design and implementation of USAID's projects in the Chapare have since eroded. After Evo Morales took office in early 2006, U.S. alternative development efforts in conjunction with Chapare municipal governments were put on hold for most of 2006 and the first half of 2007. Subsequently, USAID has returned to its policy of conditioning its assistance on prior coca crop reductions.

After years of strained and difficult relations with Chapare communities as a result of its unwillingness to work directly with coca grower unions, in 2003 USAID began working directly with Chapare municipal governments, which are led by coca growers. Between 2003 and 2006, relations with Chapare residents improved considerably and overall project design improved.²⁹ Previously, confrontational USAID policies intended to weaken coca grower unions through the formation of parallel producers' associations and the insistence that families were only eligible for assistance after all of their coca had been eradicated had provoked friction and even some attacks on USAID projects and installations. Chapare farmers complained that USAID delivered assistance unilaterally and inflexibly, with little or no attention to the needs or accumulated agricultural experience of the local population.

The approach of working via the municipal governments had proven successful with EU funding. From 1999-2006, an EU municipal strengthening program³⁰ achieved much greater acceptance by working directly with coca growers' municipal governments and by providing technical support and infrastructure in response to needs and priorities identified by the local population. According to Feliciano Mamani, Mayor of Villa Tunari, "Alternative development was previously conditioned on coca eradication. In contrast, PRAEDAC [the European initiative] has supported the municipalities unconditionally, and has been open to participation and [community] control. This means that PRAEDAC respects the population and our local leaders."³¹ They even built a new headquarters for the Chapare Six Coca Growers' Federations.

After the USAID policy shift in 2003, pragmatic municipal officials soon began working closely with USAID officials to channel U.S. funding into agreed-upon municipal projects, although they complained that the continued presence of USAID contractors made projects sometimes more than three times more expensive than other initiatives. Collaborative efforts generated more positive results, and MAS mayors, like Felipe Cáceres, even appeared on USAID promotional materials. This changed with the election of Evo Morales.

Immediately following Morales' inauguration, USAID placed the majority of these collaborative efforts with Chapare municipalities on hold. USAID officials asserted that they

needed stronger evidence that the government's "social control" efforts would be effective. Municipal officials complained that the freeze wreaked havoc with their planning, as USAID'S portion of project budgets had been suspended, provoking complaints from oversight committees and communities slated to benefit from the projects. They also complained that USAID insisted that for funding to be resumed, municipalities had to confirm that each individual community would be "drug trafficking and terrorist-free zones,"³² which local residents found insulting. Chapare-based contractors were not authorized to meet with international visitors for over a year. Chapare mayors, however, were able to replace most frozen USAID funding with largely unconditioned European and Venezuelan assistance.

In May 2007, USAID signed a letter of agreement with the Vice Ministry of Coca and integrated development covering 2007 to 2009 for the Chapare, the La Paz Yungas, and other outlying areas. Under the agreement:

- Funding and implementation are conditioned on the amount of coca produced and compliance with social control in a community;
- Alternative development efforts must be carried out in close coordination with agencies responsible for coca reduction. The head of UDESTRO (previously DIRECO) says that he must inform USAID officials frequently about progress in reducing coca;³³
- In selected regions, funding depends on agreements by farmers to not engage in coca production, with verification by the Bolivian government;
- The delineation of 220,000 hectares of "coca no expansion zones."³⁴

There is also an elaborate set of indicators to demonstrate compliance to USAID, although it will be difficult to assess the results of the project given the unwieldy number of indicators. The Bolivian government's signing of the agreement should not be interpreted as tacit acceptance of conditioning U.S. assistance on coca reduction as a viable development strategy. Rather, it shows a willingness to keep the door open to U.S. support because other funders, such as European governments, will likely compensate for shortfalls due to any U.S. funding restrictions or limitations. Indeed, with other international donors having assumed a larger role in the Chapare, USAID is planning to gradually phase out its projects in that region and to shift the bulk of its operations to the La Paz Yungas.³⁵

The EU Alternative to "Alternative Development"

Building on the relative success of its regional development initiative (PRAEDAC) in the Chapare coca growing region, the EU has worked closely with the Morales administration to meet its coca and development policy goals. One key precept of the EU program is the decision to directly support Bolivian government initiatives that recognize that coca production is a reality that will continue in Bolivia. They are also providing the government with resources to allow for measuring the impact of the cooperative coca reduction policy. Strategically, this is an effective way of gauging the government's political will to implement meaningful coca reduction. In contrast to the U.S. government, EU assistance is not conditioned on coca crop reductions.³⁶

Their current collaborative efforts focus on three key areas, developed in close coordination with local coca growing populations and government officials:

- Support for the Bolivian “Integrated Development Plan with Coca,” through funding and orientation of FONADAL, the government’s National Alternative Development Fund.
- The legal market study of the coca leaf, agreed upon in 2004, and now getting underway. Although anti-drug law 1008 stipulates that 12,000 hectares are sufficient to satisfy the demand for legal coca consumption in Bolivia, no impartial, reliable studies have been conducted.³⁷ The effort contains eight sub-studies: coca consumption in homes and businesses; average production per hectare in coca growing regions; profile of new consumers; evaluation and description of coca markets; routes, destination and volume of the internal market; ritual coca consumption; implementation and evaluation of public policies; and coca consumption traditional indigenous zones. The Morales administration has raised the permitted ceiling for coca production from 12,000 to 20,000 hectares, and has promised to either find licit uses for the amount over and above what is needed for local consumption or to eliminate it.
- An extensive “social control” program to develop and implement coca control policies, a registry of coca production, and initiatives to generate sustainable income to complement coca production. The program aims to engage existing community structures and their traditional internal community law enforcement strategies in cooperative coca reduction, monitoring, completing registries and the development of sustainable sources of complementary income.

This realistic, collaborative approach supports the Bolivian government’s effort to replace traditionally conceived “alternative development” projects with integral and sustainable economic development. In stark contrast to the INCB and the U.S. government, the EU approach takes into account the importance of coca production as a source of subsistence and for local consumption.

The long-term success of the initiative will depend on the ability of the Bolivian government to peacefully negotiate coca reduction and generate complementary income sources to offset the losses that come with reduced coca growing. Success will also depend in part on the Bolivian government’s ability to strike a balance between satisfying Washington’s demands for more immediate results with longer-term economic development goals. One high-ranking U.S. official in Bolivia has stated that “This is going to be a tough year for the Bolivian government; they will need to show results. I don’t mean that we expect for all the problems to be solved immediately, but a willingness to make adjustment to efforts that are not working is important.”³⁸ At the same time, the UNODC representative in Bolivia notes, “There is a great need for assistance ... you can’t adopt a confrontational attitude. We have clearly seen that people keep growing coca because it provides them with an income, and, obviously you cannot deprive farmers of that income without giving them something in addition or in exchange.”³⁹

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

There is growing international recognition of the need for a more effective approach to reducing crops destined for the illicit drug market – one which focuses on promoting alternative livelihoods and improved overall quality of life. A recent UN report notes that “there is little evidence that eradication reduces illicit cultivation in the long term – drug crops move, production technologies evolve, and total production decreases very slowly if at all.” The report highlights the need for a “long-term commitment to development.”⁴⁰ UNODC Executive Director, Antonio

Maria Costa, echoes this concern: “Eradication is very costly. An enormous amount of money is spent with very little accomplished.”⁴¹

Presently, the UN is carrying out an evaluation of the progress made over the last ten years in illicit drug consumption and production. This review period is an appropriate moment for the U.S. government, other UN Member States, and the UN drug control bodies to reassess drug control strategies and work towards more humane and ultimately more effective alternatives by:

- Recognizing the failure of forced eradication policies to sustainably diminish the cultivation of coca destined for the illicit market;
- Supporting sustainable and integrated development efforts, without conditioning assistance on coca reduction, in Bolivia and other coca-producing countries;
- Advocating the removal of military forces from crop reduction efforts; and
- Recognizing and addressing the inconsistencies and contradictions in existing international drug control treaties regarding the coca leaf.

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ENDNOTES

¹ See Kathryn Ledebur and Coletta A. Youngers, *Crisis or Opportunity? Bolivian Drug Control Policy and the U.S. Response*, WOLA-AIN memo, June 2006, pp. 4 – 6.

² U.S. State Department’s 2008 INCSR, 29 February 2008.
<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008/vol1/html/100776.htm>

³ White House Press Release. *Memorandum for the Secretary of State: Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2008*, 14 September 2007.
<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/prsrl/ps/92155.htm>.

⁴ U.S. State Department’s 2008 INCSR, 29 February 2008.
<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008/vol1/html/100776.htm>.

⁵ WOLA-AIN meeting with U.S. State Department officials, 20 December 2007.

⁶ “Bolivia pide a EEUU cambiar convenio de ayuda antidroga,” *La Prensa/ABI*, 4 March 2008.

⁷ According to the 2007 INCSR, the FELCN’s results for 2006 improved over those of 2005. Through 9,132 operations, the Bolivian Special Counter-Narcotics Police (FELCN) seized 1,344 metric tons of coca leaf, 14 metric tons of cocaine base and HCl, 125 metric tons of marijuana, 1,352,152 liters of liquid precursors and 323 metric tons of solid precursor chemicals. It also destroyed 4,070 cocaine base labs and detained 4,503 suspects. According to the 2008 INCSR, “In 2007, through 8,269 operations, the FELCN seized 1,330 MT of illicit coca leaf, 13.8 MT tons of cocaine base and HCl, 375 MT of marijuana, 1,174,371 liters of liquid precursors and 587 MT of solid precursor chemicals. It also destroyed 3,087 cocaine base labs, the majority being in the Chapare, and detained 3,380 suspects. All seizure and interdiction statistics increased in comparison to 2006.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ The agreement between the government and coca growers allows each family to grow one *cato*, which is 1,600 square meters or about one-third of the size of a football field.

¹⁰ Yapacani borders the Chapare region, but is within the Santa Cruz Department, currently seeking autonomy from the central government.

¹¹ U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism*, released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 30 April 2008. <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103710.htm>.

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- ¹² Garamone, Jim. "U.S. Working to Shore up Allies, Take on Narco-terror." *American Forces Press Service*, 7 October 2003. <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=28365>.
- ¹³ Testimony of General James T. Hill, United States Army Commander, United States Southern Command before the House Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, 24 March 2004.
- ¹⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2004*, pp. 450-451.
- ¹⁵ For additional information see, Kathryn Ledebur, "Bolivia: Clear Consequences," in Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, eds, *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005).
- ¹⁶ In contrast to what is often repeated in the U.S. media, the MAS administration does not control the courts, and has no way to impede arrest warrants or prosecutions.
- ¹⁷ AIN interview with Felipe Cáceres, Vice Minister of Social Defense, 8 August 2007.
- ¹⁸ "Revertirán Tierras con plantaciones de coca en el Narcotráfico," *ABI*, 15 April 2008.
- ¹⁹ Godofredo Reinicke, "Apertura del nuevo mercado de la coca," *La Prensa*, 29 May 2006.
- ²⁰ AIN interview with Joseph Manso, NAS Director, La Paz, Bolivia, 15 February 2008.
- ²¹ "Eliminaron 1.324 hectáreas de coca excedentaria," *El Diario*, 15 April, 2008.
- ²² Interview with La Asunta union leader by Valerie Schenkman and Michael Wilde, School for International Training, 12 April 2008.
- ²³ "Defensa Social halla otras siete zonas coccaleras," *La Razón*, 10 April 2008.
- ²⁴ AIN Interview with Felipe Cáceres, 8 August 2007.
- ²⁵ WOLA meeting with Felipe Cáceres, 1 May 2008.
- ²⁶ CONALTID, República of Bolivia, *Estrategia de Lucha contra el Narcotráfico y Revalorización de la Hoja de Coca, 2007 – 2010*, 2006, p. 24.
- ²⁷ For additional information see, Kathryn Ledebur, "Bolivia: Clear Consequences," *op. cit.*
- ²⁸ "Cocaleros Yungueños Se Declaran en Huelga." *Correo del Sur/ANF*, 22 April 2008.
- ²⁹ For additional information see, Linda Farthing, *Rethinking Alternative Development*, WOLA-AIN memo, February 2004.
- ³⁰ In 1998, the European Union launched the *Plan de Apoyo a la Estrategia de Desarrollo Alternativo en el Chapare* (Assistance to the Chapare Alternative Development Strategy Plan – PRAEDAC). The plan was designed to support land titling, strengthening municipal administrative capacity, natural resources and access to credit. The municipal strengthening component, the most successful area, invested \$5.86 million in the Chapare's coca-grower run municipalities with no coca-related conditions attached. The program functioned from 1999 to 2006. PRAEDAC provided the municipalities with an average of 30% of their funds. From, Linda Farthing and Benjamin Kohl. "Conflicting Politics of Development Aid in Drug-Producing Areas." *Development Policy Review*, Vol. 23, No 2, March 2005, pp. 183-198.
- ³¹ *Testimony: Eight Years dedicated to the development of Chapare*, PRAEDAC, Alternative Development in Bolivia, 27 November 2007. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/case-studies/10_en.htm.
- ³² AIN interview with Chapare municipal official, 14 December 2007.
- ³³ AIN interviews with Delfin Olivera Borja, Director UDESTRO, 10 August 2007 and 15 February 2008.
- ³⁴ *Integrated Development Strategic Objective Grant Agreement*, No. 511-0660, 11 May 2007.
- ³⁵ AIN interview with USAID officials, 15 February 2008.
- ³⁶ AIN interview with Nicolaus Hansmann, Head of Cooperation, European Commission, 15 February 2008.
- ³⁷ Although CELIN, a research organization funded by the U.S. government, published several studies suggesting significantly lower levels of traditional demand, these findings have been widely rejected as politically motivated.
- ³⁸ AIN interview with Joseph Manso, NAS Director, La Paz, Bolivia, 15 February 2008.
- ³⁹ Norha Restrepo, *Cristina Albertin: We must understand the reality in which farmers live*, UNODC web page, no date. <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/the-reality-in-which-farmers-live.html>.
- ⁴⁰ Report of the Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to the 51st Session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, *Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Crops and on Alternative Development*, March 2008.
- ⁴¹ Molly Moore, "Struggling for Solutions As Opium Trade Blossoms," *The Washington Post*, 21 March 2008.